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1. See generally Nat’l Wood Preservers, Inc. v. Commw. Dep’t of Envtl. Res., 414 A.2d 37, 40-42
(Pa. 1980) (affirming the government’s authority to require people to act in a certain manner to further the
public’s health, which has long been recognized as emanating from its “police power”). Accord O’Connor
v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 582-83 (1975).
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I. INTRODUCTION
There are few areas of government enterprise where the need to “get it
right” is so critical as formulating and executing laws affecting the public
health. When the government sets out to exercise its police power1 to control
the spread of disease, its goal is to accomplish an immensely important
practical task; and its success is to a great degree objectively
determinable—the spread of disease is either curtailed or not. However, the
manner in which the government’s goal is reached reflects not only its
pragmatic concerns but also a society’s political, social, and legal values.
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2. Daniel S. Reich, Modernizing Local Responses to Public Health Emergencies: Bioterrorism,
Epidemics, and the Model State Emergency Health Powers Act, 19 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 379,
380 (2003). See also Revised U.S. Surveillance Case Definition for Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome
(SARS) and Update on SARS Cases—United States and Worldwide, 52 CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL
MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1202 (2003), available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/
preview/mmwrhtml/mm5249a2.htm; Christopher Mason, Poor Hospital Practices Blamed for 2003 SARS
Epidemic in Toronto, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2007, at A7, available at 2007 WLNR 438221.
3. See generally Center for Disease Control and Prevention, Key Facts About Avian Influenza
(Bird Flu) and Influenza A (H5N1) Virus, http://www.cdc.gov/flu/avian/gen-info/facts.htm (stating that
Influenza A (H5N1) virus is one subtype that is highly contagious in birds and has been transmitted to
humans in limited number of cases and detailing the history and current status of avian influenza). See also
Pieter M. O’Leary, Cock-A-Doodle-Doo: Pandemic Outbreak, 16 HEALTH MATRIX 511, 514-18 (2006);
Pennsylvania Department of Health, Avian Flu, http://www.dsf.health.state.pa.us/health/cwp/view.asp?A=
178&Q=243043.
4. MSNBC.com, WHO: Bird Flu Pandemic is Imminent, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/6861065/;
Center for Disease Control and Prevention, Questions and Answers about Avian Influenza (Bird Flu) and
Avian Influenza A (H5N1) Virus: Influenza Pandemic Preparedness, http://www.cdc.gov/flu/avian/gen-
info/qa.htm#3.
5. See Center for Disease Control and Prevention, Past Avian Influenza Outbreaks, http://
www.cdc.gov/flu/avian/outbreaks/past.htm.
Recent attention to matters of public health in the area of infectious
disease have brought to the fore both the nature and effectiveness of the
federal government’s response to incidents of contagious disease, both actual
and anticipated. In 2003 Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (“SARS”), a
contagious viral disease, seemed to rapidly spread throughout a number of
countries including Canada, and to a lesser degree the United States.2
Beginning in 2003 with reports of outbreaks in various parts of the world,
much attention has been focused on what is generally referred to as “bird flu”
and commonly identified as avian influenza. There are a number of variants
of the avian flu virus, but the H5N1 virus has caused the most concern among
public health officials with regard to transmission to humans.3 It was widely
suggested that should an outbreak of the bird flu materialize, it could lead to
a worldwide epidemic, or as it was described, a “pandemic” that could result
in great loss of human life.4 This concern led to considerable activity among
public health officials throughout the world and was the subject of intense
attention in the federal government’s public health community, largely at the
Center for Disease Control. Gratefully, no worldwide outbreak, or even a
significant local outbreak of bird flu in humans in the United States seems to
have developed, and anecdotally, there seems to have been a noticeable
diminution of public attention to the pandemic issue.5
Most recently, the public’s attention has been brought to bear on the
activities of an American whose wedding celebration was interrupted by an
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6. John Schwartz, Tangle of Conflicting Accounts in TB Patient’s 12-Day Odyssey, N.Y. TIMES,
June 2, 2007, at A1, available at 2007 WLNR 10315726.
7. Felice Batlan, Law in the Time of Cholera: Disease, State Power, and Quarantines Past and
Future, 80 TEMP. L. REV. 53, 60 (2007). In discussing the nature and history of quarantines the author notes
that, “. . . [T]here has not been a widespread medical quarantine in the United States for at least eighty
years.”
8. See generally Lawrence Gostin, Scott Burris & Zita Lazzarini, The Law and the Public’s Health:
A Study of Infectious Disease Law in the United States, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 59 (1999).
international incident precipitated by his contraction of tuberculosis. Andrew
Speaker’s reported failure to adhere to the United States government’s request
to refrain from international airline travel resulted in a great deal of attention
to the potential risks associated with an individual’s reluctance to refrain from
public interaction in circumstances where he or she has a serious, perhaps
life-threatening communicable disease.6 While Mr. Speaker eventually
complied with a federal government request for isolation and treatment, and
it was ultimately determined that the government’s belief that he had the most
drug resistant form of tuberculosis was wrong, the episode brought to public
light the difficulties that the government may encounter when trying to curb
a perceived public health threat.
While the public’s attention to both episodes has diminished and the
government’s concern about an imminent outbreak of a human bird flu
pandemic has moved off the front page, each has served as a much-needed
impetus for the examination of the sufficiency of public health law and policy.
From both a practical and legal perspective public health is one of those areas
of human endeavor that tends to receive attention only when things are going
badly. Indeed, it is the absence of experience with public health emergencies,
and in particular, recent experience, that makes preparation for a public health
crisis so challenging. Quite understandably, this results in a largely untested
legal framework replete with unanswered questions and the potential for
considerable confusion.7
This article is intended to highlight significant legal issues associated
with the current state of public health law in Pennsylvania that may have
adverse practical consequences on the government’s ability to effectively
respond to a public health crisis. While the need to update state public health
laws has long been recognized,8 there has been almost no movement in that
direction in Pennsylvania. Revisions to Pennsylvania law are necessary to
assure that the response to a perceived public health emergency is not
impaired by legal uncertainty and that citizens are protected from arbitrary
government action. Perhaps this will be accomplished before the crisis begins.
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9. Id. (describing the significance of jurisdiction in the public health law arena and noting the need
to articulate clearly the scope of authority and responsibility of public health departments). See also
Elizabeth A. Weeks, Lessons from Katrina: Response, Recovery and the Public Health Infrastructure, 10
DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 251 (2007) (generally discussing the need for a coordinated response between
federal and state authorities when faced with a public health crisis and pointing out the interplay of state
and federal authority).
10. Batlan, supra note 7, at 59 (noting the potential for confusion resulting from divergent responses
to public health events from government bureaucracies). See also Kathleen C. Chen, Pennsylvania’s
Bioterrorism Act: Better Prevention from Better Preparation, 15 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 165,
175-76 (2005) (commenting on the important role of state governments while recognizing the necessity of
federal action in certain circumstances).
11. See generally Lawrence O. Gostin et al., Model State Emergency Health Powers Act: Planning
for and Response to Bioterrorism and Naturally Occurring Infectious Diseases, 288 J. OF AM. MED. ASS’N
622 (2002). See The Center for Law & the Public’s Health, Turning Point Model State Public Health Act,
http://www.publichealthlaw.net/Resources/Modellaws.htm#TP.
12. Chen, supra note 10, at 168-73 (observing the Model State Emergency Health Powers Act
(MSEHPA), which was formulated at the request of the Center for Disease Control and has been used as
basis for Pennsylvania’s Counterterrorism Act has “engendered a storm of controversy”).
Although Pennsylvania’s public health law framework is the focus of
discussion, it is likely that the issues addressed have some applicability in
other state jurisdictions and to the federal government as well. Indeed, there
is an ongoing concern about the interrelationship between federal and state
authority in the public health law arena, especially as it applies to the spread
of communicable disease. Although recent public health events have served
as a reminder of the potential need for a coordinated national, and ideally
international, effort to curb threats to the public health, the vital role of state
and local governments in this area of the law and public policy has long been
recognized.9 And given the overlapping jurisdiction of state and federal
governments in such important matters as ordering quarantines, the need for
well-conceived state statutes will remain a compelling consideration for state
legislatures.10 It must also be recognized that although there have been efforts
to formulate model acts,11 these initiatives have not been without significant
criticism and may well have some of the same limitations as are addressed
below.12
With that backdrop, it is this author’s objective to critically review
Pennsylvania’s public health law using a conceptual methodology that focuses
on the practical consequences of flaws in legislative enactments and
administrative regulations that may limit the effectiveness of the government’s
response to a public health crisis or unduly complicate it. In that regard, this
article suggests that any review of public health law requires, at a minimum,
consideration of the three following key questions: 1) which agencies or
officials, collectively referred to as a Public Health Authority (“PHA”), are
2009] CRISIS IN THE MAKING 5
13. Similarly, the significant due process issues that often arise any time the government seeks to
invade liberty interests are not addressed but are of nonetheless compelling concern. See generally Michelle
A. Daubert, Comment, Pandemic Fears and Contemporary Quarantine: Protecting Liberty through a
Continuum of Due Process Rights, 54 BUFF. L. REV. 1299 (2007); Chen, supra note 10, at 166, 186-90
(describing the due process issues associated with the provisions of Pennsylvania’s Counterterrorism Act).
14. 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 511 et seq.
15. 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2140 et seq.
16. 28 PA. CODE § 27.1 (2008).
17. 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 521.16(a) 1-12 (West 2008).
18. 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 521.16(c) (West 2008). This section provides that “[m]unicipalities
which have boards or departments of health or county departments of health may enact ordinances of issue
rules and regulations relating to disease prevention and control, which are not less strict than the provisions
of this act or the rules and regulations issued there under by the board.” Id. By adoption of the Local Health
Administration Law, Pennsylvania provides for the creation of county departments of health authorized to
act in particular circumstances. 16 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 12005 (2008). It has been observed that there
authorized or required to take action to prevent or control disease; 2) under
what circumstances can a PHA take action; and 3) what steps may a PHA take
to respond to such a public health concern.
Although these inquiries serve as the framework for this analysis, they by
no means constitute a comprehensive scrutiny of public health law. In
particular, the issue of how a PHA enforces its directives through the judicial
process is not addressed and is ultimately a matter of critical importance left
for another day.13
II. THE CURRENT STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA PUBLIC HEALTH LAW
There are three primary sources of public health law in Pennsylvania that
deal with the control of communicable disease: The Disease Prevention and
Control Law of 1955 (“DPCL”);14 the Counterterrorism, Planning,
Preparedness and Response Act (“Counterterrorism Act”);15 and Pennsylvania
Health Department regulations.16 
The DPCL includes a broad authorization for the State Advisory Health
Board (Board) to issue rules and regulations concerning the prevention and
control of both communicable and non-communicable diseases.17 Very few
rules and regulations have been promulgated and so there is much about the
application of the DPCL that remains uncertain. In addition, the rules that
have been formulated are more on the order of broad mandates rather than
narrow prescriptions for government action. Moreover, the DPCL allows
certain municipalities to enact ordinances and regulations concerning the
control and prevention of disease so long as they are not “less strict” then the
provisions of the DPCL.18 This exercise limits state preemption and sets the
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are 237 local boards or departments of health that operate outside the Local Health Administration Law.
THE ADMIN. OFFICE OF PA. COURTS, PENNSYLVANIA PUBLIC HEALTH LAW BENCH BOOK 1 (Mark I.
Bernstein et al. eds., 2007).
19. 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 521.3 (2008). “Department” is defined in the DPCL as “The State
Department of Health.” 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 521.2(d).
20. 35 PA. STAT. ANN. § 2140.301 (West 2008).
stage for considerable conflict and disparity between state and local
regulations. Finally, case law interpreting or applying the key provisions of
both the statutes and health department regulations is entirely absent.
Generally, in Pennsylvania, local and state governments have been
delegated the responsibility of controlling the spread of disease and have been
given broad discretionary authority to carry out their mandate. Specifically,
§ 521.3 of the DPCL provides as follows:
Responsibility for disease prevention and (a) Local boards and departments of health
shall be primarily responsible for the prevention and control of communicable and
non-communicable disease, including disease control in public and private schools, in
accordance with the regulations of the board and subject to the supervision and guidance
of the department; (b) The department shall be responsible for the prevention and control
of communicable and non-communicable disease in any municipality which is not served
by a local board or department of health, including disease control in public and private
schools.19
The Counterterrorism Act takes a markedly different approach from the
DPCL. While its public health provisions are also intended to limit the
transmission of a contagious or potentially contagious disease, it largely relies
on the authority of the governor rather than local officials to take action.20 In
addition, the Counterterrorism Act is based on the Model State Emergency
Health Powers Act (“MSEHPA”), and its focus is multi-faceted with limited
attention devoted to contagious disease or epidemic. Furthermore, because
government action is limited to circumstances involving a bioterrorist or
biohazardous event, and neither term is defined, there is considerably less
certainty in the Counterterrorism Act as to both the conditions that may give
rise to government action and the character of the government’s response.
Lastly, the health department regulations add little clarification with respect
to the locus of responsibility for the public health decisions required by either
the DPCL or the Counterterrorism Act.
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21. 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 521.3(a) (West 2008).
22. Id.
23. Id. § 521.2(f).
24. Id. § 521.3(b).
25. Id. § 521.7.
III. WHO CAN TAKE ACTION?
A government attempt to prevent the spread of communicable disease
may very well necessitate action that significantly interferes with individual
liberty, and must always be based on sound judgment predicated on a high
degree of scientific acumen. In turn, the government’s action has to be
sufficiently accepted by the public to assure meaningful compliance and thus
limit the scope of a public health threat. In such circumstances clearly
identifying the agencies or officials that are empowered to act to protect the
public health is of critical importance. At a time of heightened public concern,
not knowing who precisely is authorized to make potentially life-altering
decisions, such as directing isolation or quarantine, or mandating diagnosis
and treatment could result in delayed or faulty action, potentially contradictory
positions on the nature of the danger posed or what must be done to respond
to it, and a reluctance on the part of the community to follow directives or to
accept the government’s position. In this regard, Pennsylvania law presents
significant issues.
A. The DPCL
In general, the DPCL specifies that certain local governmental entities
have the responsibility to act “for the prevention and control of communicable
and non-communicable disease.”21 These PHAs are identified as “local boards
and the departments of health.”22 They are, in turn, defined as, “[t]he board of
health or the department of health of a city, borough, incorporated town or
township of the first class, or a county department of health, or joint county
department of health.”23 Therefore, in circumstances where a municipality is
not served by one of these entities, the state department of health (the
“department”) is responsible for this mission.24 
There is, however, an important caveat to the exercise of public health
responsibilities by a local PHA. The DPCL requires that a local PHA is
“subject to the supervision and guidance” of the state department of health,
suggesting that it is the state department of health that is the true
decision-maker.25 This begs the question as to whether the department can
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26. 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 521.2 (West 2008).
27. Id. § 521.7.
28. Id.
29. 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 521.11(a.1) (West 2008). Moreover, some municipalities and
counties with health departments may adopt rules that authorize other individuals or entities to act. See
generally id. § 521.16(c) (stating that municipalities which have boards or departments of health or county
departments of health may enact ordinances or issue rules and regulations relating to disease prevention and
control, which are not less strict than the provisions of this Act or the rules and regulations issued
thereunder by the board). Under such arrangements, there is no way to anticipate the role that may be played
by the state department of health or any local public health authority.
30. Id. § 521.2.
31. Id. § 521.2. Although not defined, the reference to the Secretary of Health is apparent.
32. Id. § 2140.301(a).
compel a local authority to act, forbid it from doing so, or alternately, simply
shape the character of a local PHA’s response to a public health issue. This
ambiguity has the potential to lead to divergent positions or strategies and
diminish the public’s confidence in decision-makers. 
In addition, the DPCL provides that, in certain instances, designated
individuals are authorized to take action. Specifically, the DPCL refers to
“local health officer,” “a local qualified medical health officer,” “the local
medical health officer,” and the Secretary of Health as persons who can carry
out activities set forth in the Act.26 For example, § 521.7 directs that “a local
qualified medical health officer” require an infected person “to undergo a
medical examination and any other approved diagnostic procedure.”27 This
person also has the authority to cause an individual who refuses examination
or diagnosis to be quarantined.28 However, it is left entirely to speculation as
to who is “a local qualified medical health officer.” Similarly, there is
uncertainty regarding the identity of “the local medical health officer,” who
is authorized to isolate an infected person who refuses treatment.29 A “local
health officer” is defined as the head of a local department of health.30 No
definition of the other designation is provided;31 and although not defined, the
reference to the Secretary of Health is apparent.
B. The Counterterrorism Act
Under the Counterterrorism Act, this issue is far less complicated. In
circumstances involving a public health emergency, the governor is designated
as the primary decision-maker and is authorized to temporarily isolate or
quarantine an individual or group under specified circumstances.32 Moreover,
the “department or local health department” is authorized to petition the court
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33. Id. § 2140.301(b).
34. Id. § 2140.102.
35. 28 PA. CODE § 27.1 (2008).
36. See id. § 27.65 (requiring an LHA not an LMRO to consult with the State Department before
requiring isolation of a person harboring an infectious agent).
for continuing isolation or quarantine.33 Both terms are defined. The
“department” is defined as the Commonwealth Department of Health and
“local health department” as a county department of health under the Local
Health Administration Act or certain municipal health departments.34 
C. Health Department Regulations
Under the regulations promulgated pursuant to the DPCL, action to
protect the public health may be taken by either the department of health or by
a “local health authority,” which, in turn, is defined as “a county or municipal
department of health, or board of health of a municipality that does not have
a department of health. The term includes a sanitary board.”35 In that respect,
the regulations are similar to the provisions of the DPCL. However, it is
noteworthy that the regulations require that if a local health authority (“LHA”)
is not a local morbidity reporting office (“LMRO”), the LHA must consult
with the department before acting in certain instances.36 This provides some
clarification about the circumstances when the department must become
directly involved in decision-making under the DPCL, although there is no
indication as to whether the duty to consult also requires a LHA to follow the
department’s advice.
IV. UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES MAY A PHA ACT?
The government’s ability to take steps to protect the public health must
be triggered by an event or circumstance implicating the prospect of a health
risk. Both the DPCL and the Counterterrorism Act set forth criteria by which
a PHA, or the governor, must determine the need for action. Unfortunately,
both statutes suffer from a lack of precision in this area and a tendency,
particularly with the DPCL, to afford a PHA broad discretion in defining the
circumstances under which action must be taken.
10 PITT. J. ENVTL. & PUB. HEALTH L. [Vol. 3:1
37. 35 PA. CONS. STAT. § 521.5 (West 2008).
38. Id. § 521.2. However, it must be noted that the DPCL does specify that certain PHAs are
“responsible for the prevention and control of communicable and non-communicable disease,” so it is
apparent that a PHA may act to prevent non-communicable disease as well. For purposes of this analysis,
non-communicable diseases are not addressed.
39. Id. § 521.2(c).
40. However, the DPCL was amended in 1994 to deal separately with mandatory testing for Human
Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV). The amendments were necessitated by requirements of the Federal
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 921 et seq. (1968).
41. 35 PA. CONS. STAT. § 521.11(a) (West 2008). There is no similar requirement for isolating
persons who are suspected of being infected but have refused testing. Id. § 521.7.
A. The DPCL
Under the DPCL, a PHA may be required to take action when it receives
“a report of a disease which is subject to isolation, quarantine, or any other
control measure.”37 Although the Act does not specify which diseases are
subject to “control measures,” a fair reading of the statute leads to the
conclusion it must be “. . . a venereal disease, tuberculosis or any other
communicable disease . . . .”38 Communicable disease is broadly defined as
“[a]n illness due to an infectious agent or its toxic products which is
transmitted, directly or indirectly, to a well person from an infected person,
animal or arthropod, or through the agency of an intermediate host, vector of
the inanimate environment.39 
Venereal disease is not defined.40 There is no further delineation of the
characteristics of an “illness” that allow or require action. Specifically, there
is no requirement that the illness be serious or life threatening or rise to some
level of contagion except that with regard to the isolation of an “infected”
person, the disease must be in a “communicable stage.”41 (Notably, for the
purposes of this discussion, communicable disease includes tuberculosis, but
not venereal diseases. Both the DPCL and the regulations have a number of
separate provisions applicable only to sexually transmitted diseases.)
The threshold issue is then whether a PHA is compelled to act in a
particular manner or whether its actions are discretionary and therefore more
subject to disparity and perhaps, arbitrariness. In this regard, the DPCL has
divergent and perhaps conflicting provisions. Directive language is utilized
with regard to a PHA’s general responsibility under the [A]ct. Section 521.5
provides:
Upon the receipt by a local board or department of health or by the department . . . a
report of a disease which is subject to isolation, quarantine, or any other control measure,
the local board, department of health or the department shall carry out the appropriate
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42. Id. § 521.5.
43. However, a more realistic view of the scope of a PHA’s authority comes into focus when the
practical impact of the Pennsylvania Department of Health’s sparse regulations is considered.
44. 35 PA. STAT. ANN. § 521.11(a.1) (West 2008).
45. Id.
46. See id. § 521.2(e).
control measures in such a manner and in such a place as is provided by rule or
regulation.42
While the need to act as prescribed by the rule is unequivocal, there is
obviously room for the exercise of discretion in selecting a control measure.43
This flexibility may be intended to accommodate the demographic and
resource diversity of counties and municipalities. In addition, further
indication of the directive orientation of the DPCL is found in § 521.7,
relating to examination and diagnosis, which provides that whenever a PHA
has “reasonable grounds to suspect any person being infected . . . or being a
carrier . . . ,” the PHA shall require the person “to undergo a medical
examination or other approved diagnostic procedure.” In this circumstance,
it is apparent that a PHA has no choice but to test persons it reasonably
suspects as having a communicable disease. 
The discretionary nature of a PHA’s responsibility is exemplified by
§ 521.11(a.1), which provides that a PHA “may cause” a person who is
infected with a communicable disease, including a venereal disease, to be
isolated in an appropriate institution. While directed to take “control
measures” under § 521.5, the applicable PHA is not obligated to select any
one in particular and is not required to either isolate or quarantine a person
infected with a disease in a communicable stage. Moreover, if it chooses to
isolate an individual, the PHA has the discretion to select an “appropriate
institution.”44
Finally, it is not clear under the DPCL whether a PHA is required to
compel treatment for one diagnosed with a communicable disease. There is no
provision in the Act that specifically sets forth such a requirement. However,
if the Act does require treatment, the character of the treatment is
discretionary because the Act only refers to “treatment approved by the
department or by a local board or department of health.”45 Additionally, as
will be discussed below and as would be expected, there is no discrete time
limitation on how long a person may be subject to isolation by a PHA, as the
DPCL provides that isolation may last until a disease is rendered
non-communicable.46
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47. 35 PA. STAT. ANN. § 2140.301(a) (West 2003).
48. See id.
49. See id. § 2140.102.
50. 28 PA. CODE § 27.60(a) (2008).
51. Id. § 27.1.
B. The Counterterrorism Act
As noted above, it is the governor who is the prime actor under the
Counterterrorism Act and who is authorized to act only in a case of “an actual
or suspected outbreak of a contagious disease or epidemic due to an actual or
suspected bioterrorist or biohazardous event.”47 The governor’s actions are
broadly discretionary, as the Act does not define any of these terms while
providing that he or she “may” isolate or quarantine an individual or group.48
The failure to define the terms “biohazardous” and “bioterrorist” opens the
door to a considerable range of scenarios that could give rise to action by the
governor. On the other hand, the statute limits the governor’s ability to act
under circumstances where waiting for a PHA to pursue authorization for
quarantine or isolation through judicial proceedings currently available would
jeopardize the department’s ability to prevent or limit the transmission of a
contagious or potentially contagious disease.49
Perhaps most notably, the governor’s written order for isolation or
quarantine can only last until a court reviews the matter and determines
whether such an order shall continue. The government must file a petition for
court review within twenty-four hours, or the next business day, following the
governor’s order, and a hearing must be conducted within seventy-two hours
of the filing of the petition. The court is authorized to extend the governor’s
order up to thirty days.
C. Health Department Regulations
Under the regulations, a PHA is authorized to engage in control measures
when a person has a communicable disease or infection and it is “. . .
necessary to protect the public from the spread of infectious agents.”50 The
definition of communicable disease is different than that provided in the
DPCL: “An illness which is capable of being spread to a susceptible host
through the direct or indirect transmission of an infectious agent or its toxic
product by an infected person, animal or arthropod, or through the inanimate
environment.”51 Here the illness has to be one that “is capable of being spread
to a susceptible host,” while under the DPCL, the language is arguably more
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52. 35 PA. STAT. ANN. § 521.2(c) (West 2008).
53. 28 PA. CODE § 27.60(a) (2008) [emphasis added].
54. Id.
limiting because it requires that the illness from an infectious agent be
“transmitted, directly or indirectly, to a well person from an infected
person . . . .”52 While it is not clear what the term “susceptible host”
encompasses, ostensibly it would include more than humans and thus the
range of diseases subject to control measures under the regulations would
likely extend to illnesses that are either confined to animals or transmitted
from humans to animals. This interpretation is reinforced by § 27.60, which
provides that a PHA shall direct the isolation of “a person or an animal” with
a communicable disease or infection.53
The rules also potentially broaden a PHA’s authority to act by requiring
the government to take control measures when a person or animal has a
communicable “infection,” as opposed to a communicable disease. While it
is possible to speculate that “infection” relates to a situation where one is
carrying an “infectious agent” without overt symptomology, it is by no means
apparent that this is the distinction intended by the Board. It is important to
recognize that under the rules, a PHA is required to take specified actions
when necessary to protect the public from the spread of both communicable
diseases and infections. The discretionary nature of a PHA’s authority under
the regulations permits it to determine what is needed to protect the public and
direct isolation, surveillance, segregation, quarantine or modified quarantine
or any other control measure it deems appropriate.54
V. WHAT MAY A PHA DO TO RESPOND TO A PUBLIC HEALTH CONCERN?
Ultimately, what really matters in a public health crisis or potential crisis
is the government’s ability to require individuals or entities to do things that
reduce the likelihood of the spread of disease. When a potential public health
problem emerges, the government’s response is obviously intended to have a
practical benefit; and therefore, the measure of effectiveness of a public health
statute resides in its ability to provide a PHA with the tools necessary to
respond to an outbreak of a communicable disease while at the same time
limiting the likelihood of arbitrary actions. In that regard, Pennsylvania public
health statutes have significant limitations. In general, there is broad authority
vested in public health officials particularly with regard to isolation and
quarantine directives; there is no requirement in either the DPCL or the
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Counterterrorism Law that the government adopt the control measure least
restrictive of individual liberty to effectuate public health objectives.
A. The DPCL
In general, the DPCL provides that a PHA may use “appropriate control
measures in such a manner and in such a place as provided by rule or
regulation.”55 Although the term “control measures” is not defined, § 521.5
makes reference to taking steps to respond to “a disease which is subject to
isolation, quarantine, or any other control measure.”56 Implicitly, isolation and
quarantine are authorized control measures. Moreover, a subsequent section
of the DPCL provides that a PHA must require a person to submit to a medical
examination.57 It is also apparent that a PHA has the authority to at least
request that an infected person undergo treatment.58 No other control strategies
are described or even referred to in the Act. 
While the DPCL provides some limited guidance, the manner in which
and place where control measures may be carried out are issues explicitly left
to rule making.59 Unfortunately, the regulations promulgated by the State
Advisory Health Board do not materially clarify either of these questions and,
with the exception of authorizing “placarding,” do not expand the list of
acceptable control measures. 
1. Isolation
Under the DPCL isolation is defined as:
The separation for the period of communicability of infected persons or animals from
other persons or animals in such places and under such conditions as will prevent the
direct or indirect transmission of the infectious agent from infected persons or animals
to other persons or animals who are susceptible or who may spread the disease to
others.60
Isolation is directly authorized in only one instance where a person is
infected with a communicable disease in a communicable state and refuses to
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submit to treatment. In that circumstance, either the secretary of the
department or the local health officer “may cause the person to be isolated in
an appropriate institution.”61 In no other instance is isolation, as defined in the
DPCL, explicitly authorized.
It is apparent that the PHA has broad discretion with regard to isolation
in two respects. First, it is entirely up the PHA to determine what an
appropriate institution is; and second, the PHA must determine when the
infected person has been rendered non-communicable. In circumstances where
the disease in question is a venereal disease, the DPCL specifically provides
that the person may be “received” by a county jail.62 Otherwise, there is no
designation as to an appropriate place, nor are there criteria for determining
what may be an appropriate location. Further, there is no time limitation.
There is also no provision for the isolation of someone who is infected,
but who has agreed to treatment. In this circumstance, a PHA may be able to
proceed under the quarantine provision as described below or under the “any
other control measure” provision of § 521.5.
2. Quarantine
The DPCL provides that the Secretary of the Department of Health or a
local “qualified medical health officer” may require that a person who refuses
to be examined be placed in quarantine. Quarantine is defined under the Act
as:
The limitation of freedom of movement of persons or animals who have been exposed
to a communicable disease for a period of time equal to the longest usual incubation
period of the disease in such manner as to prevent effective contact with those not so
exposed. Quarantine may be complete, or, as defined below, it may be modified, or it
may consist merely of surveillance or segregation.63
The period of the quarantine may last until it is determined that the person is
not infected or a carrier of the disease. There is no other time limitation. A
person who refuses to be examined may be “committed by the court to an
institution . . . determined by the Secretary of Health to be suitable for the care
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of such cases.”64 This suggests that a PHA is without authority to require
institutional commitment on its own. 
There are no specific guidelines for the use of quarantine, nor does the
DPCL list the type of quarantine measures that may be taken. However, given
the very broad definition of the term in the Act, it is apparent that the range of
possibilities is considerable. The notion that quarantine may be carried out “in
such a manner as to prevent effective contact with those not so exposed,”65
suggests that the only criteria for selecting the form of the measure is its
effectiveness in preventing contact. Contrary to the implication of the right of
the PHA to seek a court ordered commitment discussed above, this would
seem to connote isolation as an option. Importantly, the DPCL does not
require that a PHA or the court limit its selection to the alternative that is the
least restrictive of the individual’s liberty.
3. Involuntary Examination
The DPCL provides that a PHA may require a person who it reasonably
suspects is infected or a carrier of a communicable disease “to undergo a
medical examination and any other approved diagnostic procedure.”66 If the
person refuses, then a PHA, limited to either the secretary of the department
or the “local qualified medical officer,” may cause the person to be
quarantined.67 The quarantine may last until it is determined that the person
is not infected or is not a carrier. Alternatively, either person may petition the
Court of Common Pleas seeking an order to compel the examination. Unlike
the PHA who compels quarantine, the Court must find that the person refused
to be examined for no valid reason before ordering an examination or
subsequently committing the person to an institution “determined by the
Secretary of Health to be suitable for the care of such cases.”68
4. Involuntary Treatment
There is no provision in the DPCL that authorizes a PHA to require
treatment. However, there is certainly an implication in § 521.11 that a PHA
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may request it. It is not clear just how far it may go in ultimately coercing it.
The stated remedy provided in § 521.11 for refusing treatment is isolation “in
an appropriate institution . . . until the disease has been rendered
non-communicable.” This may be accomplished through court action. If a
person refuses treatment, a PHA is authorized to petition the Court of
Common Pleas, and the Court may commit the person to an appropriate
institution after a hearing.69
Of potential practical significance is the Act’s provision that certain
forms of spiritual healing constitute acceptable treatment. Section 521.11(a.3)
expressly approves of such treatment:
. . . it is understood that treatment approved by the department or by the local board or
department of health shall include treatment by a duly authorized practitioner of any well
recognized church or religious denomination which relies on prayer or spiritual means
alone for healing: Provided, however, That all requirements relating to sanitation,
isolation or quarantine are complied with.70
This section seems to suggest that where spiritual treatment has been chosen
by an infected person that a PHA is authorized to use other control measures
including isolation. This appears to be contrary to the language set forth in §
521.11(a) that the PHA may cause a person to be isolated when treatment is
refused. 
B. The Counterterrorism Act
1. Isolation
The term is not defined in the Act, but the governor is authorized to
temporarily isolate a group or individual suspected of having or actually
having a contagious disease due to an actual or suspected bioterrorist or
biohazardous event. The governor may only order isolation if going through
judicial proceedings “currently available” would cause a delay that would
prevent or limit the PHA’s ability to prevent or limit transmission of a
contagious or potentially contagious disease to others.71 If the governor
proceeds without judicial authorization, he or she must petition the court
within twenty-four hours, and after a hearing, the court may order continued
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isolation for thirty days with additional isolation authorized, if warranted,
upon further review.
2. Quarantine
The term is not defined in the Act. The Act makes no distinction between
isolation and quarantine, and it would appear that the government’s authority
with regard to quarantine is the same as isolation. As with isolation, a
governor’s order is subject to judicial review .72
3. Involuntary Examination
There are no provisions related to this issue in the act.
4. Involuntary Treatment
There are no provisions related to this issue in the act.
C. Health Department Regulations
The DPCL’s “control measure” approach to the spread of communicable
disease is further developed in the regulations. Section 27.60(a) provides that
a PHA:
. . . shall direct . . . any other control measure the Department or the local health authority
considers to be appropriate for the surveillance of the disease, when the disease control
measure is necessary to protect the public from the spread of infectious agents.73
Section 27.60(b) further provides:
The Department and local health authority will determine the appropriate disease control
measure based upon the disease or infection, the patient’s circumstances, the type of
facility available and any other available information relating to the patient and the
disease or infection.74
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1. Isolation
The definition is, in all material respects, identical to that set forth in the
DPCL. Contrary to the DPCL, the regulations seem to require that a PHA
isolate a person who has a communicable disease. Section 27.60 provides that
the PHA “shall direct the isolation of a person or an animal with a
communicable disease or infection.”75 The regulations provide little guidance
as to the proper place for isolation, but § 27.61 suggests that forms of isolation
other than institutionalization may be appropriate by requiring that
instructions be given to specified persons “defining the area within which the
case is to be isolated and identifying the measures to be taken to prevent the
spread of the disease.”76 
Section 27.87 provides that a PHA shall isolate a person infected with a
communicable disease who refuses treatment in an appropriate institution, “if
it determines the action advances public health interests.”77 Although the
character of the institution is not precisely defined, it must be an institution
designated by the PHA and the isolation is to continue until the person is
rendered non-communicable. The rules also provide that the PHA may release
an individual from isolation when it determines the person no longer presents
a threat to the public health.78
There are special isolation rules for persons infected with tuberculosis.
A person who is suspected of having tuberculosis is to be kept in his or her
residence if facilities for isolation are available there and the person accepts
the isolation.79 If isolation in the person’s residence cannot be accomplished,
then isolation is to occur in a manner as contemplated for other communicable
diseases.80
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2. Quarantine
Under the rules, the definition of quarantine is similar but not identical
to that found in the DPCL. As with isolation, the regulations require that a
PHA shall direct the “. . . surveillance, segregation, quarantine or modified
quarantine of contacts of a person or an animal with a communicable disease
or infection.”81 However, the rules also ascribe to a PHA broad discretionary
authority by providing that a PHA “shall determine which contacts shall be
quarantined, specify the place to which they shall be quarantined, and issue
appropriate instructions.”82 The regulations also provide that a person under
quarantine may be moved from one place to another as otherwise provided
under § 27.67, ostensibly to avoid contacts with others.83 
There is one material difference in the definition that could significantly
affect the duration of quarantine. The definition in the regulations states that
a quarantine may last for “a period of time equal to the longest usual
incubation period of the disease, or until judged non-infectious by a
physician.”84 This language does not appear in the DPCL and is not further
explained in the regulations. By simple referring to “a physician,” it raises the
prospect that the opinion of any physician notwithstanding the expression of
a contrary view, or for that matter an incorrect conclusion, may control the
decision of the PHA. Moreover, the failure to adopt a more exacting standard
sets the stage for potential conflict between a patient’s physician and the
government’s physician. It also denotes that moving beyond the incubation
period and being “non-infectious” are not necessarily synonymous.
Apparently, the regulations contemplate that one can be non-infectious prior
to the conclusion of the period or perhaps continue to be infectious following
the incubation period. This is obviously a matter of scientific determination,
and thus the opinion of an appropriate expert regarding this matter would be
essential.
3. Involuntary Examination 
The authority of a PHA to require testing under the regulations is similar
to the DPCL. Whenever a PHA has reasonable grounds to suspect that a
person has been infected with an organism causing a communicable disease,
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it may require the individual to submit to a medical examination and “any
other approved diagnostic procedure.”85 If the person refuses, the PHA may
cause the person to be quarantined until “it is determined that the person does
not pose a threat to the public health . . . .”86 As with the DPCL, the rules
authorize a PHA to petition the court in circumstances where the person
refuses a quarantine directive, and the court, following a hearing, may commit
an individual who continues to refuse an institution determined by the state
department of health to be suitable to care for such individuals.87 Also,
consistent with the DPCL, a person ordered by the court to be examined may
be examined by a physician of his or her choosing.88
4. Involuntary Treatment 
Section 27.88 allows the PHA to order certain individuals to undergo
preventative therapy, that is, therapy designed to prevent a disease from
reverting to a communicable stage:
If the disease is one which may be significantly reduced in its communicability following
short-term therapy, but is likely to significantly increase in its communicability if that
therapy is not continued, such as tuberculosis, the Department or local health authority
may order the person to complete therapy which is designed to prevent the disease from
reverting to a communicable stage, including completion of an inpatient treatment
regimen.89
The form of treatment for a communicable disease is not otherwise specified.
Like the DPCL, the regulations allow the PHA to petition the court in the
event that an individual refuses treatment and, although the court after a
hearing shall, upon finding that the person has refused treatment, “issue an
appropriate order,” nothing in the regulations state that the court can compel
treatment. 
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VI. ISSUES OF COMPELLING CONCERN: A SUMMARY
A. Delineating Clear Lines of Authority and Responsibility
In a time of a real or potential crisis, knowing which governmental
authority or individual is authorized to act and perhaps more significantly,
who has the responsibility to act, is of paramount importance. The DPCL and
related regulations need to be clarified to assure that decision-making will not
be stymied by uncertainty about who has the authority. The DPCL does not
sufficiently differentiate the authority of local public health authorities from
that of the department. As noted above, the Act does not indicate whether the
department has veto power over decisions of local public health authorities.
Although the department is designated as a supervisor who provides guidance
to a local PHA, neither the DPCL nor the regulations give precise parameters
to that role. Consider that the DPCL unequivocally states that the primary
responsibility for prevention and control of communicable disease resides
with “[l]ocal boards and departments of health.” This ambiguity gives rise to
the prospect of perhaps contradictory decisions with potentially disastrous
results. There is a limited safeguard provided by the DPCL’s provision that if
the secretary of the State Department of Health determines that the local
PHA’s “disease control program” is so inadequate that it constitutes a
“menace to the health of the people,” he or she may appoint agents to carry
out a disease control program.90 Unfortunately, “disease control program” is
not defined, and it is not clear that this authority applies to a local decision in
an individual case or circumstance.
While it is conceivable that this situation could be clarified by
administrative rulemaking, it has not been to date. With respect to issues
involving examination, treatment, quarantine and isolation of persons who
have or are suspected of having a communicable disease, the regulations
simply state that either the department or local health authority is authorized
to take the appropriate action.91 The regulations do not address the relationship
between state and local public health officials in any manner that clarifies the
lines of authority or responsibility in this area of vital public concern.
Moreover, the terms “local qualified medical health officer” and “local
medical health officers” are not defined in the statute and, although the
regulations do not use these designations, they do not alter the authority of
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such individuals to take certain actions specified in the DPCL.92 In each
instance, the terms connote a plethora of possible actors including virtually
any physician and a variety of other health care workers who may be
authorized to take action. Neither term explicitly incorporates the designation
of “local health officer,” a term that is defined in the DPCL as the head of the
local department of health.93 The use of these terms seems to connote someone
with some form of medical training.
Even if it were to be assumed that the legislature intended some
relationship among these designations, or for that matter, that they all referred
to the same individual, the question remains as to what separates a “qualified”
medical health officer from one who is not, and a “medical health officer”
from one who is simply a health officer. The DPCL says that a “qualified”
officer may order a person suspected of being infected to undergo an
examination and diagnostic testing and to quarantine the person for refusing
to comply. If the court is ultimately requested to enforce an order from such
an individual, it may well be necessary to determine what it means to be
“qualified.” Because a “local qualified medical health officer” has designated
public health responsibilities and the authority, under certain circumstances,
to quarantine someone, such a distinction is of great importance; it would
seem reasonable to know if this includes the family doctor, a podiatrist, a
dermatologist, a nurse or any other health care provider. While the rules
provide for a position designated “health officer” in certain municipalities, the
person selected does not have to be a physician.94
The Turning Point Model State Public Health Act (“Model Act”), the
product of a collaborative initiative involving five states and a number of
national organizations and experts in the field of public health, provides no
guidance with regard to the relationship between state and local PHAs.95
Indeed, it seems to leave this issue to the drafters of state statutes by referring
to either a “state or local public health agency” as the actor responsible for
undertakings such as mandatory treatment,96 quarantine, and isolation,97
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without delineating particular lines of authority. It does, however, distinguish
between those who are authorized to carry out the provisions of the Act, i.e.,
anyone so designated in a statute or regulatory scheme, from those who have
the authority to “manage and supervise” an agency’s activities.98 The Model
Act avoids the problem of designating a public health role for individuals
whose titles are left undefined.
While under the Counterterrorism Act it is specifically provided that the
governor is authorized to act, the question remains as to who actually
determines that there is a cognizable threat in the first place. This is
particularly significant because as noted above the governor can only act in
limited circumstances where inter alia there is an outbreak, actual or
suspected, of a contagious disease due to a bioterrorist or biohazardous event
and where the failure to do so would jeopardize the department’s ability to
curtail the transmission of a contagious disease.99 None of the critical terms
are defined in the act and there is no framework, other than consultation with
the “Secretary of Health,” for interpreting whether the prerequisite conditions
to the exercise of the governor’s authority have been met.100
Therefore, for example, if it were reported to the police in Scranton,
Kane, or Harrisburg, that there was what appeared to be an outbreak of an
unknown disease of uncertain origin in the area of a waste-water treatment
plant, or perhaps another “white powder” incident at a courthouse, it is unclear
as to whom the Commonwealth must rely to make necessary determinations.
In other words, who assesses whether the material or situation is, in fact, a
contagious disease resulting from a biohazardous event? Only then does the
incident require immediate action, so it is essential to know who advises the
Governor or a PHA accordingly. Moreover, who will be responsible for
coordinating the overall government response and, in particular, assuring that
the perhaps divergent priorities of criminal justice and public health
authorities are properly accommodated? One can only assume that these issues
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would eventually get sorted out, however, any initial delay caused by either
role ambiguity or a failure of necessary expertise could be very costly. In a
similar vein, the consequences of precipitous action predicated on bad
information or poor advice could be far-reaching for individuals unnecessarily
subjected to quarantine or isolation orders. In addition, while these issues
could well be addressed through administrative rule making, the Board has yet
to adopt any.
The provisions of the MSEHPA are applicable to circumstances where a
governor of a state declares a “public health emergency.”101 Such an
emergency arises only when there is a high probability of a large number of
deaths, serious or long-term disabilities, or widespread exposure to agents that
pose a significant risk of substantial future harm.102 In such a circumstance,
the governor is authorized to take certain steps to respond to the threat of a
public health crisis while the coordination of matters pertaining to a public
health response is left to the PHA. Unfortunately, MSEPHA defines PHA in
such a way as to include both state and local officials without delineating their
respective scope of authority.103 It, therefore, offers little guidance in
formulating a practical approach to adjusting Pennsylvania’s public health law
in a way that avoids confusion in the face of a public health event.
B. Controlling the Government’s Discretion
While there can be no doubt that the government’s mission of responding
to a public health concern is an essential component of a state’s police power,
determining when and how that power should be exercised is the sine qua non
of public health policy. In part, this is because the state of science and more
specifically, medicine is inherently dynamic and as such, both the way we
view the severity and the significance of a health condition may very well
change over time. Yesterday’s epidemic may be rendered nothing more than
an interesting historical event by the development of an effective vaccine or
treatment, improvement in environmental conditions, or simply because of a
change in the way in which a culture views it. The DPCL, for example, singles
out both tuberculosis and venereal diseases for particular attention.104 While
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there are very important reasons to be concerned about both of these disease
classifications, with the development of modern antibiotics, there is nowhere
near the level of concern that existed when the DPCL was originally adopted.
Yet even that has changed recently because the bacterium that causes
tuberculosis has developed a strain that is resistant—sometimes very much
so—to current modes of otherwise effective treatment.105 
When then is the threat to the public’s health sufficient to justify the
government’s intervention? The law must serve as a vehicle for answering this
question and provide a protocol for governmental decision-making. The
challenge is to do this in a way that accommodates the compelling need to take
effective action while minimizing the risk of unnecessary restrictions on
individual liberty. While the conditions that give rise to government action
need to be delineated with a degree of precision, this must be accomplished
without being so restrictive that the government’s ability to respond to serious
threats to the public’s health is impaired or disabled. In addition, although
discretionary authority to act in such matters is essential, the need for
competent scientific and medical expertise in support of decision-makers is of
critical importance. Protecting the public’s health demands scientifically
supported decision-making.106 The definitions of both the DPCL and the
Counterterrorism Act need to be revisited to provide for more precise
standards related to a PHA’s decision to act in the face of a public health
concern. In its present form, the definition of “communicable disease” is so
broad that it is unworkable. The Board, through its rule-making power, has not
provided any guidance. As a consequence, a PHA has almost unlimited
discretion in selecting control measures necessary to respond to a public
health event involving communicable disease whether it be an outbreak of bird
flu or the common cold. 
This issue is addressed in the Model Act in more than one way. For
example, with respect to mandatory treatment, the Act provides that a state
may require a person to undergo medication therapy only when infected with
“. . . a contagious disease that poses a significant risk to others or the public’s
health.”107 By imposing a “significant risk” condition, the Model Act
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specifically limits the circumstances under which the government may act to
require treatment for an infectious disease. 
Perhaps most significantly, the Model Act requires that when a public
health agency acts “to accomplish essential public health services and
functions, it shall, to the extent possible, employ the policy or practice that
least infringes on the rights or interests of individuals.”108 The drafters of the
Model Act reinforced the importance of this conceptual scheme by
specifically requiring that the use of isolation and quarantine must be
effectuated by the “least restrictive means” required to prevent the spread of
a contagious disease.109 By adopting a least restrictive alternative approach to
the overall application of the Act, it reduces the prospect that the
government’s response to a public health concern will be disproportionate to
the actual threat posed to the public. This concept is not included in either the
DPCL or the Counterterrorism Act, nor is it apart of the Board’s
regulations.110 However, it is a concept that is firmly imbedded in
Pennsylvania jurisprudence. The Mental Health Procedures Act has embraced
the notion that the government’s response to persons suffering from a serious
mental illness and who require involuntary treatment must be measured and
proportionate such that it “. . . shall impose the least restrictive alternative
consistent with affording the person adequate treatment for his condition.”111
Moreover, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has long recognized the
constitutional mandate to limit the exercise of government power in restricting
personal liberty to means that are narrowly rather than broadly tailored in
order to achieve the government’s legitimate purposes.112 In large part, this
orientation towards a minimalist approach to public health policy results from
a belief that many, if not most, people afflicted with a communicable disease
will voluntarily seek treatment, comply with the governments request to obtain
it, or embrace other restrictions. For those who do not, it is likely the result of
some psychological condition that interferes with their rational
decision-making ability. For this group, lesser rather than greater efforts on
the part of the government may well be adequate to meet the governments
concern.113 On the other hand, this assumption may be entirely too optimistic.
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In the face of what is portrayed or perceived as an imminent health threat,
compliance with even relatively innocuous preventive measures may be
seriously problematic because of distrust of either the government or medical
community or because of the inherently uncertain nature of a public health
threat presented. Therefore, any least restrictive alternative requirement must
be adopted in a context that explicitly contemplates its practical limitations.
MSEHPA, by definition, limits action to circumstances that meet a certain
threshold of seriousness. This is encompassed in the definition of public
health emergency. Most notably, however, the MSEHPA also embraces the
least restrictive alternative approach to isolation and quarantine that is so
critical to the conceptual scheme of the Model Act: “Isolation and quarantine
must be by the least restrictive means necessary to prevent the spread of a
contagious disease or possibly contagious disease to others and may include,
but are not limited to, confinement to private homes or other private or public
premises.”114
C. Harmonizing Statutory and Regulatory Provisions
At a time of crisis, the law should be a source for direction that points the
way for government action in a clear and concise manner. The existence of
separate statutes dealing with what are essentially identical public health
concerns poses a barrier to effective and proper governmental action. Whether
a contagious disease is the result of a bioterrorist or biohazardous event,
however defined, or of some natural phenomenon, it may be of immense
practical consequence in terms of the steps needed to ultimately stop its
spread. However, from the perspective of the kind of legislative guidance
needed to deal with a public health crisis, divergent statutes that incorporate
contradictory or differing terminology and differing mechanisms for
decision-making only serve to obfuscate the matter and serve as a barrier to
sound and expedient decision-making. There is no public policy or other
reason that Pennsylvania could not adopt a single statutory scheme that
incorporates the provisions of both the DPCL and the public health sections
of the Counterterrorism Act. This would allow for conceptual clarity, common
terminology, uniform procedures, and a single source for administrative rule
making, while assuring the flexibility critical for an effective localized
response.
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VII. CONCLUSION
The disaster that followed Hurricane Katrina serves as an example of how
and why preparedness is much more than a state of mind and that there can be
little comfort in the mere existence of laws or the development of plans. In the
final analysis, in times of crisis, it is performance that counts. Pennsylvania
has a body of public health law that provides for the implementation of
various measures to control the spread of contagious diseases in varying
circumstances. It has provided for the development of plans to respond to
health and other emergencies.115 However, the cornerstone of Pennsylvania
public health law, the DCPL, has not been comprehensively overhauled since
its adoption in 1955. Even more importantly, its efficacy has never been
seriously tested in the context of a significant public health crisis and, as a
consequence, it has received almost no judicial attention. A similar situation
exists with the Counterterrorism Act, although it is of far more recent vintage.
And though the Board is authorized to formulate rules to facilitate the
implementation of the DPCL, it has not done so in any kind of comprehensive
manner.
How then will Pennsylvania perform in the face of a threatened public
health crisis, including the outbreak of deadly flu epidemic or antibiotic
resistant tuberculosis or some other ominous but yet to be identified infectious
agent? Unless key aspects of Pennsylvania law are clarified and/or modified,
we risk far from adequate performance from public officials responsible for
the public’s health. Responding to a public health crisis should not be an
experiment. That which we will learn from our ultimate mistakes and the
shortcomings of our laws should give us no comfort. Now is the time to act to
address the limitations of our statutory and regulatory scheme.

